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ABSTRACT: We compare three different views on the long run
efficiencies of emission taxes which include thresholds, and of tradable
emission permits where some permits are initially free. The differences are
caused by different assumptions about whether thresholds and free permits
should be subsidies given only to firms that produce, or full property
rights. Treating tax thresholds, as well as free permits, as property rights
would depart from the conventional view, but would allow greater
flexibility in making economic instruments both efficient and acceptable.
Such flexibility could be very important in achieving efficent control of
greenhouse gas emissions. (JEL H23, Q28)1. Introduction
Do emission taxes and tradable emission permits have the same long run
efficiency properties? How much inframarginal emissions should firms pay
for, to maximise the efficiency of either of these instruments? The
conventional view, summarised by Baumol and Oates (1988), is as follows.
To achieve optimal exit of firms from an industry, and thus long run
efficiency (maximisation of the net social benefits of abating emissions),
firms must pay for all inframarginal emissions under a tax. But in contrast,
some or all inframarginal emissions can remain uncharged under tradable
permits, through the initial issue of free (‘grandfathered’) permits, without
harming long run efficiency.
However, there are at least two dissenting views on long run efficiency.
Such dissent matters for policy applications where, for reasons that do not
involve exit-entry effects, the form of uncertainty about marginal costs and
benefits makes tax (price-based) instruments significantly more efficient than
permit (quantity-based) instruments (Weitzman 1974). Controlling
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is probably such an application, for
geophysical reasons noted by Pizer (2002) and summarised below; it is also
the largest potential use of economic instruments of environmental policy.
But if, following the conventional view, exit-entry efficiency requires all
inframarginal emissions to be paid for under a tax, then an efficient, price-
based instrument will be politically unacceptable, because such a tax takes
large amounts of revenue away from emitters who have considerable
political power. On the other hand, if one of the dissenting views is
followed, and inframarginal GHG emissions can be exempted from taxation
without harming exit-entry efficiency, then large revenue transfers can be
avoided, and efficient, price-based control can thus be made acceptable.
1The GHG case thus motivates this paper, but it does not restrict the
analysis, which can apply to many different emissions. Section 2 describes,
but does not explain, the detailed disagreements among the conventional and
two dissenting views about the long run (exit-entry) efficiency of taxes
versus tradable permits. Section 3 explains the disagreements in terms of the
underlying assumptions made about the charging of inframarginal emissions,
and how this affects entry and exit. Section 4 discusses the possible merits
of different assumptions, with particular reference to GHG (essentially
carbon dioxide) emissions, and Section 5 concludes.
As will already be clear, our framework is political economy: we hope
to improve the efficiency (overall welfare outcomes) of the environmental
policies that are actually chosen and promoted by the political process. The
formal analysis will abstract from many issues which influence such choices.
These include innovation, uncertainty, trade, stranded capital, employment,
general equilibrium effects of raising and refunding revenue, and hybrid
mixtures of taxes and tradable permits.
1 However, a brief mention of the
last two issues is relevant at the outset. First, there has been much debate
in recent years about the general equilibrium (often called ‘double dividend’)
effects of tax and tradable permit schemes. Broadly, this debate has
concluded that it is more efficient for all such schemes to charge for all
inframarginal emissions, so that revenues thereby raised can be used to
reduce existing distortionary taxes (see for example Goulder, Parry and
Burtraw 1997, or Bovenberg 1999 for a review). This argument is quite
different to the entry-exit effects which concern us here, so discussion of
general equilibrium effects is deferred until much later. Second, it is well-
1. See for example Jensen and Rasmussen (2000), who estimate empirically all these
issues except innovation, uncertainty and mixed instruments, for the case of
controlling carbon dioxide emissions in Denmark.
2known that a hybrid of taxes and tradable permits is possible and may be
desirable under uncertainty (Roberts and Spence 1976; Baumol and Oates
1988, pp75-77). But for simplicity, discussion of this is deferred until the
very end, and taxes and tradable permits are treated separately until then.
2. Three views on taxes versus tradable permits
The disagreements among the three views are most simply seen by
starting with the ‘uniform’ case, which includes GHG emissions, where
emissions from firms in different locations mix completely before having
any environmental impact. The value of environmental damage D, caused
by an industry of n identical, perfectly competitive firms
2 each with a level
e of emissions (measured in say tonnes per year), then depends only on total
emissions ne: D(n,e)=D(ne).
The first, conventional view of the efficiency of taxes and tradable
permits in the uniform case was laid down as the textbook approach by
Baumol and Oates (1988, Chs. 12 and 14). It has been confirmed by recent
texts such as Hanley et al. (1997, pp72-5 and 133-6), Lesser et al. (1997,
pp157-9) and Xepapadeas (1997, pp16-9), and is taken as given by many
non-economists (see for example Wiener 1999). It holds the following. Let
the marginal damage cost of the desired level of total emissions be t
(measured for example in dollars per tonne). Let the general tax scheme be
such that any firm with polluting emissions at level e (measured for example
in tonnes per year) pays the control authority at a rate
2. For our purposes, there is no loss of generality from assuming identical, competitive
firms, even though identicalness actually eliminates the static efficiency advantage of
economic over regulatory instruments. Before finally applying the findings here to
any real cases, firm heterogeneity and market power would need to be considered.
3t(e−e0) (1)
dollars per year. The constant threshold e0 is normally the level of
inframarginal emissions which remains uncharged for; but it can also be
‘supramarginal’, for if e0 > e, the authority pays the firm t(e0−e) dollars per
year. (Other possible names for e0 in a tax system are ‘allowance’,
‘baseline,’ ‘benchmark’ or ‘credit’, though in normal practice a ‘credit’
excludes the supramarginal case.) The authority neutralises any spare
revenue (or expenditure) that results from (1) by lump sum payments to (or
taxes from) all consumers. The conventional view holds that long-run
economic efficiency, with optimal output and emissions by both each firm
and the industry, can be reached only if the threshold e0 is zero for all firms,
meaning a pure Pigovian tax (Baumol and Oates 1988, p228). Any positive
threshold is held to create a subsidy worth te0 > 0, which causes entrance by
new firms, excessive industry size and total emissions, and hence long run
(allocative) inefficiency.
However, this inefficiency result is held not to apply to the case of
tradable emission permits, where a firm’s payment (not necessarily to the
control authority) is also given by (1), t is the annual rental price of a
perpetual permit,
3 and e0 is the number of permits initially given free
(‘grandfathered’) rather than auctioned to polluters. It is held that free
permits do not affect exit-entry decisions, and long run efficiency is attained
for any intermediate division between free and auctioned permits. A
common variant of the conventional view is simply to ignore the possibility
3. A perpetual permit is for one tonne of emission per year forever. In a competitive
market, the purchase (rather than annual rental) price of such a permit would be t/r,
where r is the annual interest rate.
4of a positive e0 in the case of taxes, but to fully accept it for tradable
permits.
4
A second, less common view was proposed by Carlton and Loury (1980)
for taxes (which were actually on output not emissions, but the same result
holds for emission taxes), and by Kling and Zhao (2000) for tradable
emission permits. According to the latter’s analysis, which we revisit below,
"auctioned and free permits have different long-run [allocative] efficiency
implications"; and "For uniformly mixed pollutants [including the problems
of global warming, ozone depletion and acid rain]...all permits should be
auctioned" (italics added).
5 This advice is radically different from the
grandfathering of permits that actually happened under the U.S. sulphur
trading program set up by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, as analysed
for example by Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) and Stavins (1998). It is
also poles apart from current plans in many countries for implementing the
Kyoto Protocol. Variants of the second view are found in Cramton and Kerr
(1999), who argued for fully auctioned permits, but for reasons of
transaction efficiency (to avoid the rent-seeking costs of deciding on the
distribution of permits) and equity, rather than allocative efficiency; and in
Spulber (1985), who considered only pure Pigovian taxes and fully auctioned
permits, for reasons of equity.
4. See for example Ekins and Barker (2001, p330): "In any scheme, a proportion of
permits can be auctioned and the rest allocated free of charge: this flexibility gives
permit schemes an advantage over corresponding carbon taxation where,
conventionally, all revenues are received by governments."
5. The analogous result in Carlton and Loury is Theorem 3, though they mainly
emphasised other theorems which hold for non-uniform pollution, when damage
cannot be written as D(n,e)=D(ne).
5The third, also minority, view on the long run efficiency of taxes versus
tradable permits was proposed by Pezzey (1992) and Farrow (1995, 1999).
They independently claimed that payment (1) can achieve long run allocative
efficiency, for both taxes and tradable permits, irrespective of the value of
e0. This then allows either tax thresholds or free permits to be distributed
flexibly, by whatever criterion is needed to secure political adoption of either
economic instrument. However, if the criterion is effectively that the
instrument should leave an industry’s profits unchanged, this need not mean
giving thresholds or free permits to cover all of the controlled level of
emissions. In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, Pezzey and Park (1998)
noted that carbon-fuel suppliers as a whole have considerable market power,
and hence will enjoy large rents if given free permits for all their carbon
sales while total carbon sales are simultaneously cut back by the permit
scheme. Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) quantified this idea using a
computable general equilibrium of the US economy, and found that carbon
suppliers need only a small fraction of their required tradable permits to be
free, in order for the permit policy to leave their profits unchanged.
3. The different assumptions underlying each view
Which of the three views is right? All of them are, in that all of them
draw correct conclusions from their underlying (though sometimes implicit)
assumptions. It is the difference in assumptions that explains the difference
in views. To show this, let us first clarify two different ways to apply the
economic instrument defined by (1):
(a) te0 can be a lump sum subsidy, that a firm gets if, and only if, it
produces output. A lump sum subsidy thus adds te0 to any existing or
6new firm’s economic profit, defined as the financial difference between
producing and not producing.
(b) te0 can be a lump sum property right, that an existing firm (defined as
a legal entity, not as a production facility) gets, but any new firm does
not get, whether or not either type of firm produces output.
6 As
analysis below will remind us, a lump sum right has no effect on a
firm’s economic profit from producing, in the same way that the amount
of land that a competitive firm owns, rather than rents, has no effect.
With this terminology, the differences between the assumptions made about
te0 by the three views can be summarised in the following table.

























As a subsidy As a property
right
6. By ‘property right’, it is understood that e0 would have good characteristics in all
six dimensions listed by Devlin and Grafton (1998, Ch. 3): exclusivity, quality of title,
durability, transferability, divisibility and flexibility. In this context, it is perhaps
unfortunate that Pezzey (1992) referred to payments made when emissions fall below
a property right threshold as ‘subsidies’.
7The conventional view’s asymmetry of assumptions explains its
asymmetric conclusion about taxes versus tradable permits. If instead it
treated free permits as a subsidy available to all producing firms, then te0
would be added to a firm’s economic profit, free permits would cause
excessive firm entry, and the Carlton/Kling results would follow. Or if
instead the conventional view treated a tax threshold as a property right and
not a subsidy, then the sum te0 would disappear from a firm’s economic
profit, long run efficiency would be restored, and the Pezzey/Farrow results
would follow.
A further insight, which also brings in the case of non-uniform pollution,
comes from combining the Pezzey/Farrow and Kling and Zhao approaches
as follows. Let e0 in (1) be treated as a property right for each firm,
independent of whether or not it produces, as in Pezzey or Farrow. Now
add an extra policy instrument, a subsidy level e1 that each firm gets only
if it produces, as in Kling and Zhao, except that we apply the combined
scheme to either taxes or tradable permits. Each firm’s payment for
emission level e(q,a), where q is its output and a its abatement effort, is then
t[e(q,a)−e0−e1]. (2)
If n is the number of firms as before, P(nq) is the industry’s product price,
and c(q,a) is each firm’s total cost of output, then a producing firm’s
accounting profit is P(nq)q − c(q,a) − t[e(q,a)−e0−e1]. However, the right
e0 is valuable whether or not the firm produces, so the accounting profit if
the firm shuts down is te0, not zero. (The profit te0 would come either from
payments by the control authority in the tax case, or from the firm renting
out its unused permits.) The economic profit from producing, used to make
entry-exit decisions, is then the difference between these two sums:
π = P(nq)q − c(q,a) − t[e(q,a)−e1]. (3)
8The equilibrium of an industry of price-taking firms is given by π =0 ,
∂π /∂ q = P(nq) − cq(q,a) − teq(q,a) = 0, and (4)
−∂π /∂ a = ca(q,a)+tea(q,a)=0 . ( 5 )
If the total cost of environmental damage is D(n,e), more general than
the D(ne) assumed above in Section 2, then the government’s optimisation
problem (ignoring general equilibrium efficiency effects from revenue raised)
is to choose policies so that the resulting q, a and n maximise the social
surplus u(q,a,n): =∫ 0
nqP(x)dx − nc(q,a) − D(n,e(q,a)). This requires the first
order conditions
(∂ u/∂ q)/n = P(nq) − cq(q,a) − De(n,e)eq(q,a)/n = 0 (6)
−(∂ u/∂ a)/n = ca(q,a)+De(n,e)ea(q,a)/n = 0 (7)
∂ u/∂ n = P(nq)q − c(q,a) − Dn(n,e)=0 ( 8 )
Comparing the two sets of conditions (π = 0 and (4)-(5), with (6)-(8)),
it is straightforward to show that the optimal government policy is





Here, e* is the optimal level of emissions per firm; q, a and n are implicitly
also at their optimal levels; and the elasticities of pollution damage with
respect to each firm’s emission, and to the number of firms, are respectively
defined as in Kling and Zhao:
ε
D
e(n,e): =De(n,e)/[ D(n,e)/e]; ε
D
n(n,e): =Dn(n,e)/[ D(n,e)/n]. (10)
The efficient and acceptable policy thus has three elements:
(i) a per unit emission price t* as in (9). This is created directly by a
tax, or indirectly by the market price of a tradable permit;
(ii) an emission right e0*. This should be set flexibly, and perhaps
individually, for existing firms, at whatever intermediate value 0 ≤
9e0* ≤ e* is acceptable (not just the extreme values e0*=0o re0*=
e*), given the balance of political, and general equilibrium
efficiency, considerations. However, e0* should be zero for all new
firms. The political considerations should include the effects of the
industry’s market power, noted at the end of Section 2 but omitted
from the above model; and also perhaps the (distortionary, but
persuasive) case for raising some revenue that is ‘earmarked’ for
public spending on emissions abatement (see for example Teja and
Bracewell-Milnes 1991 and Wilkinson 1994). The general
equilibrium efficiency consideration is the ‘double dividend’ effect,
noted in the Introduction but also omitted from our model, whereby
lowering e0*, and thus raising more revenue to spend on reducing
existing, non-environmental taxes, raises overall welfare. A final
consideration is to create and distribute the rights e0* on some
historical basis, to minimise the rent-seeking costs that any
legislative process of defining scheme (2) will inevitably generate;





happen, for example in the case of concave local damage, where
D(n,e)=nd(e), d′ (e)>0a n dd″ (e) < 0). The formula for e1*i n( 9 )
is from Kling and Zhao, and it corrects for the difference between
the number of firms and emissions per firm in determining total
pollution damage.





n, so by (10), the optimal subsidy level e1* is zero. However, the
emission right e0* remains a vital tool, crucially affected by political
10considerations, to ensure that an economic approach to pollution control is
acceptable and thus actually adopted.
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4. Discussion of assumptions made about tax thresholds or free permits
In this section, we aim to compare objectively the assumptions, clarified
by the above analysis, that underlie the three views about taxes and tradable
permits. This comparison focuses especially on the expected administrative,
political and economic characteristics of a control instrument which was
analysed above but does not yet exist in practice: the emission tax threshold
which is a property right rather than a subsidy. Our conclusion is simple but
contentious, and is worth stating now: Rather than being written off as
counterintuitive, or impossible because it has never yet been implemented,
the tax-threshold-as-property-right, an idea first proposed by Mumy (1980),
deserves further investigation, particularly for GHG control.
The first step towards this conclusion is to argue that whenever
institutional assumptions are made about treating tax thresholds or free
permits as subsidies or property rights, they should be explicit. The
assumption that a positive emission tax threshold e0 in (1) lowers a firm’s
average cost, and hence gives a higher profit which encourages firm entry
(see for example Baumol and Oates, pp 218-20), is widespread, but is often
implicit. It amounts to a decision to treat the tax threshold as a (production-
7. For the uniform pollution case (i.e. with e1* = 0), it has been shown (for example
by Goulder, Parry and Burtraw 1997) that if marginal environmental benefits are
below some critical value, then as a result of general equilibrium effects, even a small
amount of abatement using a non-revenue-raising instrument (where e0*=e*) reduces
efficiency. In such a case, it might be that no level of e0* can be found, for either
taxes or permits, that is both acceptable, and results in (2) improving efficiency.
11dependent) subsidy, while the same author often treats free tradable permits
as property rights. This decision should be clarified and explained: it may
be a good description of how current tax and permit schemes work, but they
need not work that way forever.
The next step is to compare the second view of taxes and permits
against the first, conventional view. Should free tradable permits be treated
as subsidies, and thus cause excessive entry and long run inefficiency, as
Kling and Zhao assume? Such treatment is always possible, and indeed it
happened in the US lead trading program of the 1980s. Then, firms received
permits based explicitly on their current output level, and thus had an
incentive to stay in business to collect the implicit subsidy generated by free
permits. But unless the efficiency loss from such entry-exit distortion is
smaller than the cost savings from not having to administer permits owned
by firms no longer producing, there is no need to create such a scheme.
Indeed, the US sulphur allowance trading scheme that started in 1990,
already mentioned in Section 2, effectively (if not legally) treats free permits
as property rights rather than as subsidies.
The third step in our argument is about the empirical relevance of tax
thresholds to GHG control, economically the world’s biggest pollution
control problem. Though there is great uncertainty about both the costs and
benefits of control, the stock effect caused by the long atmospheric lives of
most GHGs almost certainly makes the marginal benefit cost curve much
flatter than the marginal control cost curve (Pizer 2002, Philibert 2002; and
this argument may well also apply to other long-lived stock pollutants).
Therefore, following Weitzman (1974), it would be better to use a tax-based
instrument to control the price of GHG emissions, than to use permits to
control the quantity of emissions. However, this observation has had no
effect on the international debate on GHG control until recently. Arguably
12because of the conventional view of the efficiency of taxes versus tradable
permits, widespread proposals for carbon taxes in the early 1990s considered
only pure taxes, and ignored the possibility of tax thresholds. (As noted by
Ekins and Speck 1999, many proposals exempted key emitters altogether,
but that is different.) Political resistance to the amounts of revenue that such
pure taxes would raise was too great to be overcome. So the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol instead adopted tradable permits as the economic instrument of
choice, because free permits obviously raise no revenue. However, the great
uncertainty in the likely future permit price − precisely the point of the
Weitzman analysis − seems to have been crucial in causing the effective
withdrawal from the Protocol by the U.S.A., by far the world’s largest GHG
emitter, in 2001. The Kyoto-derived emphasis on permits still dominates
much economic analysis of policy options (see for example Dewees 2001);
and comparisons of GHG permits and taxes typically consider only pure
taxes, albeit with tax revenue refunded by reduced income or other taxes
(see for example Svendsen et al 2001). So the GHG case shows that it is
indeed crucial for policy analysis to consider a full range of economic
instruments, including taxes; and that making taxes politically acceptable
requires the use of thresholds, to avoid the huge revenue transfers from well-
organised, carbon-intensive industries that pure taxes cause.
The fourth and fifth arguments for at least investigating tax-thresholds-
as-rights are defensive, and address their perceived or actual weaknesses in
ways that go beyond allocative efficiency. The fourth tackles a common
criticism of their possible administrative costs. For the control authority to
pay out te0 forever to firms that have shut down, as required by e0 being a
full property right, would obviously be costly to administer. This is
particularly true if international transfers of rights are allowed, as might
occur with GHG control. But it is not at all clear why such perpetual
payment should be infeasible, as Baumol and Oates (1988, p216) suggested.
13If a government can pay interest on perpetual bonds, a bank can pay interest
forever on its accountholders’ balances, and a limited company can pay
dividends forever on its shareholders’ balances, why cannot a pollution
control authority pay at its currently chosen rate t forever to legal holders of
e0 in emission tax thresholds?
8 But if such administration is indeed too
expensive, then added rules, like a minimum holding size or maximum
holding life for threshold owners which are not producing firms, could
reduce the cost. Or, one could justifiably go further and make thresholds
dependent on production like normal tax credits (so they are then no longer
property rights), if the resulting loss of exit-entry efficiency is smaller than
the saving achieved in administrative costs (Farrow 1999).
The fifth argument addresses not administrative, but net budgetary, cost
to the authority. Such a cost would happen with a tax threshold scheme if
average emissions per firm eventually fall below the average of the initial
thresholds given to firms, making the average firm’s ‘payment’ t(e−e0) large
and negative (using the uniform formula (1) here for simplicity). This might
well happen because the authority overestimates firms’ emission control
costs when initially setting t and e0; and it would be a serious comparative
disadvantage of tax threshold schemes, since it does not happen with free
permit schemes, where revenue neutrality is automatic. One could hope that
budgetary cost could be avoided by initially setting e0, the average threshold,
low enough. In the GHG case it should be low anyway, to offset the
monopoly power of carbon suppliers in the GHG case, as already noted. But
8. A further point is that, contrary to Baumol and Oates’ suggestion, there is no need
for "...potential entrants into the polluting activity [to] be eligible for the subsidy to
prevent them from initiating waste generation simply to qualify for the lump sum
payment". The rules of a thresholds-as-rights scheme would clearly rule out such a
open-class qualification rule.
14in competitive cases where such arguments do not apply, budgetary cost
could be limited (or prevented, also as normal with tax credits) by instead
departing from the pure scheme (1). One could for example replace (1) by:
the firm pays t(e−e0)i f e ≥ fe0, for some 0 < f ≤ 1; ) (11)
but pays −t(1−f)e0 if e < fe0.)
This would limit the authority’s maximum payment to a firm to t(1−f)e0, and
thus prevent payment altogether if f = 1. Such a limit would give some
firms too little incentive to keep reducing emissions, so again some
allocative efficiency is lost; but this might be justified if such loss is less
than the welfare (and political) cost avoided of the authority having to raise
other taxes to fund a net budgetary cost.
5. Conclusion: the need to consider a full range of instruments, and a
full range of costs
Our aim has been to show that the differences among three distinct
views, about the long run efficiencies of emission tax and tradable emission
permit schemes, can be explained by different underlying assumptions made
about the thresholds or free permits built into such schemes. Only if
thresholds are treated as lump sum property rights rather than subsidies, can
a tax-with-thresholds scheme achieve long run efficiency, and thus be added
to the list of schemes which can be both efficient, and acceptable because
they avoid raising too much revenue from politically powerful emitters. In
the last section we built up an argument for taking such a thresholds-as-
rights scheme seriously, by debating various aspects of institutional design.
However, we are arguing only for further investigation, not for definitely
adopting a scheme of tax-with-thresholds-as-rights, even for the case of
GHG emissions where the probable flatness of the marginal benefits of
15emission control favours price-based over quantity-based control. For one
thing, we have already given administrative or budgetary cost reasons why
the pure designs (1) and (2), which are allocatively efficient for uniform and
non-uniform emissions respectively, may need to be modified. For another,
there are doubtless important legal questions to be answered, jurisdiction by
jurisdiction, of which we have said nothing. Lastly, there is a whole class
of hybrid economic instruments of control, which we mentioned in the
Introduction but have ignored since. It now deserves further comment.
Roberts and Spence (1976; see also Baumol and Oates pp.75-7) extended
Weitzman’s analysis of instrument choice under uncertainty, to show that a
hybrid mixture of taxes and tradable permits is possible, and can be more
efficient than either pure taxes or pure tradable permits. For the case of
GHG control, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997a, 1997b) and Pizer (1997,
2002) have proposed such a hybrid system. Control would be by tradable
permits, but permit price uncertainty would be capped by governments
selling unlimited permits once some ceiling price is reached.
9 Pizer (2002),
who follows the conventional view on tax thresholds, finds that
"This system turns out to be only slightly more efficient than a pure tax system.
However, it achieves this efficiency while preserving the political appeal of
permits: the ability to flexibly distribute the rents associated with emission
rights."
Such a mixed system may well turn out to be the most workable, efficient
and acceptable system for some pollutants in some places. But we have
argued that tax thresholds can also flexibly distribute the rents created by an
9. The Roberts and Spence scheme also requires governments to buy permits once a
floor price is reached, but this is omitted from recent proposals. Pizer gives the
dynamic inefficiency of subsidies as a reason, citing the Baumol and Oates argument.
We have contested this argument in Section 4; but even so, there would also be the
problem of how governments would pay for such buying at the floor price.
16emissions control policy, and so may deserve consideration for other
pollutants and places. Our overall conclusion is that policy design needs to
consider both a full range of instruments (taxes, permits, and hybrids of
taxes and permits, with intermediate levels of tax thresholds or free permits,
and possible limits on market incentives), and a full range of costs
(allocative, administrative, and ‘political’), before the best instrument for any
particular application can be found.
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